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Existing research has documented the large impact that automatic enrollment has on savings plan participation.
All the companies examined in these studies, however, have combined automatic enrollment with
an employer match. This raises a question about how effective automatic enrollment would be without
a direct financial inducement not to opt out of participation. This paper's results suggest that the match
has only a modest impact on opt-out rates. We estimate that moving from a typical matching structure
- a match of 50% up to 6% of pay contributed - to no match would reduce participation under automatic
enrollment at six months after plan eligibility by 5 to 11 percentage points. Our analysis includes a
firm that switched from a match to a non-contingent employer contribution. This firm's experience
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Companies have used a variety of approaches to encourage participation in 
employer-sponsored savings plans. The most common approach, the provision of an 
employer matching contribution, is now offered by the vast majority of large firms (Profit 
Sharing Council of America, 2006). Even with a match, however, savings plan 
participation rates are often surprisingly low (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2005), and 
empirical studies of matching contributions’ effect on plan participation have uniformly 
found relatively small effects (Andrews, 1992; Papke and Poterba, 1995; Papke, 1995; 
Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues, 1998; Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox, 1998; Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002; Even and Macpherson, 2005; Duflo et al., 2006; 
Engelhardt and Kumar, forthcoming). 
Automatic enrollment is an alternative mechanism for increasing savings plan 
participation. In a standard opt-in enrollment scheme, employees must actively elect to 
participate in the plan if they wish to contribute. In contrast, under automatic enrollment, 
employees are enrolled in their employer’s savings plan at a default contribution rate and 
asset allocation unless they actively make an alternative choice. Relative to the standard 
opt-in approach, automatic enrollment dramatically increases plan participation, 
particularly among younger, low-tenure, and lower-income employees (Madrian and 
Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002, 2004; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, 
and Madrian, 2008). The participation rate increase at one year of tenure is as much as 60 
percentage points. 
All of the companies in which automatic enrollment has been studied to date have 
also offered an employer matching contribution. In principle, the match gives most 
employees a strong reason not to opt out of participation (and indeed, few do). But some 
extensions of automatic enrollment, such as the Automatic IRA proposal in the U.S., do 
not include a matching contribution. The extent to which automatic enrollment’s 
effectiveness relies on the presence of a match is an open question. Without a match, the 
opt-out rate could be much higher, since participation incentives are greatly reduced. On 
the other hand, if employee inertia drives the automatic enrollment participation effect, 
we might expect high participation rates even without a matching contribution. 
We estimate the employer match’s impact on savings plan participation under 
automatic enrollment in two ways. First, we study a large firm (Company A) using   4
automatic enrollment that replaced its employer match (25% on the first 4% of pay 
contributed) with an employer contribution equal to 4% of pay plus an annual profit-
sharing contribution. The employer contribution in the new regime was not contingent on 
the employee’s contributions. We find that among new hires with six months of tenure, 
savings plan participation rates decreased by at most 5 to 6 percentage points after the 
firm eliminated the employer match, and overall average employee contribution rates fell 
by 0.65% of pay. 
Second, we pool data on savings plan participation at nine firms with automatic 
enrollment. We use variation in the match structure both across and within firms to 
identify the relationship between participation rates and the match. This analysis is 
potentially confounded by firm-level omitted variables but still offers suggestive 
evidence. We find that a one percentage point decrease in the maximum potential match 
as a fraction of salary is associated with a 1.8 to 3.8 percentage point decrease in plan 
participation at six months of eligibility. Thus, moving from a typical matching structure 
of 50% on the first 6% of pay contributed to no match at all would reduce savings plan 
participation under automatic enrollment by 5 to 11 percentage points. These results, 
along with those for Company A discussed above, lead us to conclude that automatic 
enrollment participation rates are positively related to match generosity, but the 
magnitude of this effect is modest. 
Section I describes the savings plan and data for Company A. In Section II, we 
analyze the impact of Company A’s change from a matching contribution to a non-
contingent contribution. Section III examines the relationship between plan participation 
and the employer match amount at nine firms with automatic enrollment. Section IV 
concludes. 
 
I. Savings Plan and Data for Company A  
Company A is a Fortune 500 company in the information sector. We will consider 
this firm’s employee savings outcomes from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 
2005. Table 1 lists the salient features of Company A’s 401(k) plan. Plan eligibility is 
restricted to employees aged 21 or older. Full-time employees who satisfy this age 
requirement are immediately eligible to participate, while part-time employees are   5
eligible only after reaching one year of service and having worked 1,000 hours. Because 
of eligibility differences between full- and part-time employees, we restrict our analysis 
to full-time employees who are eligible for the plan.
1 Throughout the sample period, full-
time employees were automatically enrolled in the 401(k) plan. After 30 days of service, 
employees who did not make an active enrollment election were enrolled at a 
contribution rate of 3% of salary allocated entirely to a money market fund. The plan 
offered six other investment options, including employer stock. 
Until December 31, 2003, the company made matching contributions at a rate of 
25% on employee contributions up to 4% of pay for employees who had attained at least 
one year of service and 1,000 hours of work (thus, the maximum possible employer 
match was 1% of pay). The maximum contribution rate over this time period was 25% of 
pay. On January 1, 2004, the company discontinued the employer match and replaced it 
with an employer contribution of 4% of pay plus an annual profit-sharing contribution 
that was not guaranteed in advance. In 2004 and 2005, this profit-sharing contribution 
was 5% of salary. The employer contributions in the new regime were not contingent 
upon the employee’s contributions.
 The company also reduced the maximum employee 
contribution rate to 15% of pay at this time. Throughout the entire sample period, 
employees were also subject to IRS annual dollar contribution limits.
2 Those employees 
classified as “highly compensated” for IRS non-discrimination testing purposes were 
potentially subject to stricter contribution rate limits, and for this reason we exclude them 
from the analysis below. 
Our employee-level data come from Hewitt Associates, a large U.S. benefits 
administration and consulting firm. We have a series of year-end cross-sections of all 
Company A employees from 2002 through 2005. These cross-sections contain 
demographic information such as birth date, hire date, gender, and compensation. They 
also contain 401(k) variables such as the initial plan eligibility date, current participation 
                                                 
1 We do not observe full- or part-time status directly in our data. In order to screen out part-time employees, 
we eliminate those who did not become eligible for the plan within two months of hire. Even though full-
time employees were immediately eligible upon hire, we keep employees with up to a two-month eligibility 
lag to allow for the possibility of administrative delays. 
2 In the sample we analyze, only eight out of 645 employees contributed enough in a year to plausibly be 
constrained by the IRS annual dollar contribution limits. The results we report below do not account for 
this censoring, but they are unaffected if we exclude these eight employees from the analysis.   6
status, initial plan participation date, a monthly contribution rate history, and year-end 
asset allocation and total balances. 
Our analysis compares two Company A employee cohorts. The “match cohort” 
contains plan-eligible full-time employees hired between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 
2003. The “no-match cohort” contains plan-eligible full-time employees hired between 
January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005. We exclude employees hired between July 1, 2003 
and December 31, 2003 because these employees were hired under the old regime 
(employer match), but the point at which we measure participation and contribution 
outcomes for our analysis is after the switch to the new regime (a non-contingent 
employer contribution). Because our primary outcome variables—plan participation and 
employee contribution rates—are measured at six months of tenure, both cohorts are 
further limited to include only individuals whose employment at the company lasted for 
at least six months. 
Company A made several significant acquisitions during our sample period. 
Unfortunately, our data do not identify those employees who joined the firm as a result of 
these acquisitions. To minimize the potentially confounding influence of these 
acquisitions, we make three further restrictions to our sample. First, we exclude 
employees who lived in states where the acquired companies were headquartered. 
Second, we exclude employees whose initial appearance in our dataset does not 
correspond to their year of hire (e.g., we exclude employees who are first observed in our 
data in the 2004 cross-section but who are listed as being hired before 2004).
3 Third, we 
exclude employees whose hire dates are revised by more than one calendar month across 
different year-end cross-sections.  
Our final sample contains 645 employees: 293 in the match cohort and 352 in the 
no-match cohort. 
 
                                                 
3 We make one exception to this second criterion. There are 22 employees who first appear in our data in 
the year-end 2003 cross-section with December 2002 hire dates. We include these employees in the sample 
because their absence from the 2002 data is likely due to administrative delays in processing new 
employees at year-end rather than due to an acquisition.   7
II. Savings Plan Outcomes under Automatic Enrollment with and without an 
Employer Match: Company A 
  We begin our analysis by comparing means across the match and no-match 
cohorts. We first consider plan participation, which we define as having a positive (non-
zero) employee contribution rate. The first row of Table 2 shows that 89.1% of match-
cohort employees were participating in the savings plan at six months of tenure. In 
contrast, the six-month participation rate for the no-match cohort is 80.7%. This 8.4 
percentage point difference in participation rates across the two cohorts is statistically 
significant and relatively stable from two months of tenure onward. The second row of 
Table 2 shows average employee contribution rates at six months of tenure (including 
non-participants with a contribution rate of 0). Given the decline in plan participation, it 
is not surprising that the average contribution rate also falls from 3.60% to 2.89% of 
salary after the elimination of the employer match. This 0.71% drop is statistically 
significant and driven both by the participation decline and a reduction in the average 
contribution rate conditional on participation from 4.04% to 3.58% of pay. The 0.46% 
drop in the conditional average contribution rate, however, is only statistically significant 
at the 10% level and is partly explained by the concurrent reduction in the maximum 
allowable contribution rate from 25% to 15% of pay. 
  Figure 1 shows the distribution of employee contribution rates at six months of 
tenure for the two cohorts separately. We see that the transition from the employer match 
to the non-contingent contribution was associated with a decrease in the fraction of 
employees contributing at most positive rates.
4 More than two-thirds of employees in 
both cohorts contribute at the 3% default contribution rate, consistent with previous 
research on how automatic enrollment affects the employee contribution rate distribution 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2002, 2004; Beshears, 
Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2008). In contrast to previous research, we observe very few 
employees contributing at the 4% match threshold (only 2% of employees in the match 
cohort and 1% of employees in the non-match cohort for whom the match threshold is no 
longer relevant). There are several plausible explanations for why so few employees in 
                                                 
4 The decline in the fraction of employees contributing at a rate greater than 15% in the non-match cohort is 
an artifact of the reduction in the maximum allowable contribution rate from 25% to 15% of pay that 
coincided with the switch from a matching contribution to a non-contingent contribution.   8
the match cohort are at the match threshold. First, the employees at Company A are 
observed at only six months of tenure, which does not give them much time to switch 
from the default contribution rate to the match threshold (or another contribution rate of 
their choosing). Second, because the match threshold was only one percentage point 
above the default rate, participants’ incentive to increase their contribution rate to the 
match threshold was much weaker than in other firms studied (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, 
and Metrick, 2005). Finally and perhaps most importantly, employees were not eligible to 
receive matching contributions until having completed one year of service, so most of the 
benefits from contributing at the match threshold did not accrue to employees at six 
months of tenure. 
  Of course, the transition from an employer match to a non-contingent contribution 
may have been accompanied by other changes at Company A that caused the savings 
plan choice differences between the two cohorts. Table 2 shows that relative to the non-
match cohort, the match cohort was disproportionately female, somewhat older, and had 
a higher average salary.
5,6 Not controlling for these differences could make the 
participation decline due to the employer match elimination look larger than it really was. 
Table 3 shows the results of regressions that include demographic explanatory 
variables. The first two columns show the coefficients from a linear probability 
regression of savings plan participation at six months of tenure on an indicator for having 
been hired with an employer match in place, gender, age, and income in 2004 dollars. In 
column 1, we control linearly for age and income, whereas in column 2 we include age 
and income splines.
7 The estimated 6.0 to 6.7 percentage point participation impact of 
having a match is statistically significant and somewhat lower than the raw 8.4 
percentage point difference seen in Table 2. A probit specification (columns 3 and 4) 
yields estimated employer match marginal effects of 5.4 to 6.5 percentage points, also 
                                                 
5 We deflated the salaries of employees in both cohorts to 2004 dollars using the growth in seasonally 
adjusted average weekly earnings for private sector workers from the Current Employment Statistics 
survey. 
6 Part of the difference in average age and income between the cohorts might be the result of an internship 
program that took place in the second half of the sample period. Compared to other employees, interns 
probably have weaker motives to participate in the 401(k) plan. To make sure that the presence of interns is 
not driving our results, we drop the 29 employees in the sample with incomes of less than $10,000 and redo 
our analysis. The qualitative results do not change. 
7 The age spline has knots at 30, 40, and 50 years, and the income spline has knots at $20,000, $40,000, 
$60,000, and $80,000.     9
statistically significant. Columns 5 and 6 list the marginal effects from a tobit regression 
of employee contribution rates which are censored below at zero and above at 25% (the 
match cohort) or 15% (the non-match cohort). Eliminating the employer match at 
company A is associated with a contribution rate decline of about 0.66% of salary, an 
effect that is statistically significant and only slightly less than the 0.71% raw effect in 
Table 2. 
In summary, controlling for demographic differences between the match and non-
match cohorts reduces but does not eliminate the estimated impact of the employer match 
under automatic enrollment. Note that these estimates represent the combined effect of 
removing the match and replacing it with a non-contingent contribution. The replacement 
of a match with a (relatively larger) non-contingent contribution generates a substitution 
effect that discourages employee contributions and a net income effect that also 
discourages employee contributions. Employee contributions are no longer subsidized 
and the employee has more total savings (employee plus employer contributions) for any 
given employee contribution.
8 Our estimates provide an upper bound of the effects due 
solely to the removal of the employer match, since the simultaneous introduction of the 
non-contingent employer contribution generates an income effect that suppresses 
employee contributions.
9  
Our analysis also sheds light on the question of savings crowd-out. Our estimates 
provide an upper bound on the negative participation effects due solely to the 
introduction of the non-contingent contribution, since the simultaneous elimination of the 
match is likely to have discouraged employee participation.
10 
One limitation of many savings studies that use administrative data is the inability 
to address potentially offsetting (or reinforcing) changes in savings behavior outside of 
the account being studied. This caveat applies here as well. Employees have additional 
                                                 
8 The employee loses a 25% match on contributions up to 4% of income but gains both a non-contingent 
employer contribution equal to 4% of income and a non-contingent profit-sharing contribution. 
9 On the other hand, there are some plausible reasons that the introduction of the non-contingent 
contribution could increase employee contributions.  Employees might view it as a signal that their 
expected future income growth has fallen. Alternatively, employees could interpret the non-contingent 
contribution as implicit advice that their optimal savings rate is higher than they previously believed. 
10 A match unambiguously increases participation in a two-period model. Opposite effects are possible in 
models with more periods. However, the empirical literature on matching generally finds positive 
participation effects. Note that even in a two-period model, matching need not increase the average 
employee contribution due to the substitution effect.   10
assets outside their 401(k) plan, and some employees also have other savings plan assets 
within Company A, which has an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). However, 
most of the employees in our non-match sample are not eligible to participate in the 
ESOP (employees must have one year of service to be eligible). Moreover, the plan is 
non-elective; the company makes ESOP contributions on an annual basis to all 
employees who are eligible. With more years of data, it might be possible to assess the 
extent to which changes in ESOP balances across the two cohorts affect employees’ 
401(k) choices at company A.
11 Unfortunately, the data are not presently available to 
undertake such an analysis, and we do not observe any other financial assets of this 
company’s employees. 
 
III. Employer Matching Level and Savings Plan Participation under Automatic 
Enrollment at Nine Companies 
  We now broaden our analysis to explore the relationship between the generosity 
of the employer match and savings plan participation under automatic enrollment at nine 
companies. We use variation in the employer match structure both within and across 
firms for identification. However, because of the potential existence of firm-level omitted 
variables, the results below must be interpreted with caution.  
Table 4 describes the match structure at the nine companies used in our analysis. 
The match rate varies from no match at Company A (beginning in 2004 for the non-
match cohort) to a 133% match on the first 6% of pay at Company I. Conditional on 
offering a match, the match threshold ranges from 2% of pay for employees with less 
than one year of tenure at Company F to 7% of pay at Company B. Two companies have 
changes in their employer match over our sample period: Company A (analyzed in 
Sections 2 and 3), which replaced its employer match of 25% on the first 4% of pay 
contributed with a non-contingent employer contribution in January 2004; and Company 
B, which gradually increased its match rate from 60% to 62% to 65% on the first 7% of 
pay contributed.  
                                                 
11 Madrian and Shea (2001), who first documented large participation increases following automatic 
enrollment in a 401(k) savings plan, find no evidence of offsetting savings behavior in the Employee Stock 
Purchase Plan (ESPP) of the company they studied.   11
For this section’s analysis, we use data that are identical in structure to the 
Company A data described in Section 2. We pool employees at the nine firms who are 
observed in at least one of the year-end cross-sections from 2002 through 2005.
12 Our 
sample is limited to employees at these firms who meet the following criteria: they 
became eligible for their employer-sponsored savings plan between January 1, 2002 and 
June 30, 2005; they became eligible when they were between 21 and 65 years of age; 
they became eligible when automatic enrollment was in effect; and they did not leave the 
company within six months of becoming eligible. Unlike the analysis in Sections 2 and 3, 
we do not attempt to filter out part-time employees because we are unable to identify 
them for some of the companies. We also do not exclude “highly compensated” 
employees because we are only analyzing plan participation, a margin on which such 
employees do not face greater constraints than non-highly compensated employees. 
  To assess the relationship between the employer match and savings plan 
participation under automatic enrollment, we run a linear probability regression of 
savings plan participation at six months of eligibility on age, income in 2004 dollars, 
gender, and the generosity of the employer match.
13,14 Our key dependent variable of 
interest is the maximum employer match (as a fraction of income) that a participant can 
receive by contributing at the match threshold and fulfilling all match-related service 
requirements, given the match structure in place at six months of eligibility. The 
maximum employer match does not necessarily correspond to the matching contribution 
an employee could receive after only six months of eligibility. For example, the 
maximum employer match as just defined at Company D is 4.2% of pay (a 70% match on 
the first 6% of pay), even though employees with less than one year of tenure can receive 
a match of at most 2.1% of pay (a 35% match on the first 6% of pay). Table 4 lists the 
maximum employer match used in our regression for each of the nine firms.  
                                                 
12 Three firms did not have data available for all four years. We drop three additional firm-years because 
different employees within a company were offered different matches in these years and we are unable to 
identify which employees were offered which match. 
13 Even though our dependent variable is binary, we use a linear probability regression rather than a probit 
in order to facilitate the graphical display of the results in Figure 2. 
14 Instead of measuring participation at six months of tenure, as done earlier for Company A, we measure 
participation after six months of eligibility because some firms’ employees are not immediately eligible 
upon hire. For most employees in the sample, however, six months of tenure and six months of eligibility 
are equivalent.   12
Our employer match variable definition rests on the assumption that employees 
are forward-looking with respect to the match when making their decision about whether 
to opt out of savings plan participation under automatic enrollment. Given that the service 
requirement to obtain the maximum employer match is at most one year in our sample, 
we feel that this assumption is appropriate. Only three of our nine firms (Companies A, 
C, and H) have matches linked to tenure. We also assume that the match rate changes 
within companies A and B were surprises that were not known to employees in advance, 
since we define the maximum employer match using the match structure in place at the 
time we measure participation.  
Because our maximum employer match variation is largely across-firm variation, 
we are precluded from putting firm-level fixed effects in these regressions. We do, 
however, calculate Huber-White standard errors with clustering at the firm level. 
  Column 1 in Table 5 gives the coefficient estimates from the regression described 
above when no other control variables are included. In this specification, decreasing the 
maximum employer match by 1% of salary is associated with a plan participation 
reduction at six months of eligibility under automatic enrollment of 2.8 percentage points. 
This is somewhat smaller than the 5 to 6 percentage point decline observed at Company 
A when it eliminated its employer match. However, as noted earlier, the Company A 
estimate is an upper bound on the true effect of match removal, since the match was 
replaced with a non-contingent employer contribution that is theoretically expected to 
decrease participation.  
  Figure 2 displays the regression results from the first column of Table 5 
graphically. Every data point in Figure 2 corresponds to a group of employees that shares 
the same firm and maximum employer match (firms whose match changes over time are 
represented in the graph by more than one data point). The maximum match is on the x-
axis, and the raw savings plan participation rate is on the y-axis. The regression line from 
the first column of Table 5 is also shown. Figure 2 shows that the positive relationship 
between the maximum match and participation estimated in Table 5 is robust and does 
not seem to be driven by outliers.   13
  In column 2 of Table 5, we add control variables, using linear splines for age and 
income as well as indicator variables for missing gender, age, and income data.
15 The 
inclusion of demographic controls reduces the estimated impact of the employer match 
slightly: decreasing the maximum employer match by 1% of salary is associated with a 
2.2 percentage point decline in participation, rather than the 2.8 percentage point decline 
shown in column 1. 
Most of the individuals for whom gender, age or income data are missing come 
from three firms. Therefore, we restrict the sample in column 3 to the six firms for which 
we can construct demographic controls.
16 When we run the regression without control 
variables—as in column 1—on this restricted sample, the estimated impact of the 
employer match increases relative to that in column 1; participation declines by 3.8 
percentage points when the maximum match decreases by 1% of pay. This suggests that 
there are some differences between the companies in our sample for which we do and do 
not have demographic data.  
Finally, in column 4, we add the demographic control variables to the regression 
restricted to companies with demographic information. Just as in the full sample, adding 
demographic controls to this restricted sample reduces the estimated impact of the 
employer match. Across all of the specifications in Table 5, the coefficient on the 
maximum employer match ranges from 1.8 to 3.8, indicating that decreasing the 
maximum employer match by 1% of salary reduces savings plan participation at six 
months of eligibility under automatic enrollment by 1.8 to 3.8 percentage points.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
  Automatic enrollment is an increasingly important feature of the retirement 
savings landscape. A recent survey of large U.S. firms found that 36% already 
automatically enroll new employees, and 55% of firms without automatic enrollment say 
that they are very likely or somewhat likely to adopt it within a year (Hewitt Associates, 
2007). To date, all the automatic enrollment savings plans that have been studied have 
                                                 
15 The results are qualitatively similar if we use linear controls for age and income rather than splines. 
16 Even within those companies for which we have demographic information, some employees are 
nonetheless missing this information.  We drop these employees with missing demographic data from the 
regressions in columns 3 and 4.   14
had an employer match. U.S. pension regulations encourage the use of matching through 
safe harbor clauses; firms can avoid non-discrimination testing if they have a sufficiently 
generous match. However, there is also has a safe harbor for non-contingent employer 
contributions.
17 
This paper aims to address how effective automatic enrollment might be in the 
absence of an employer match. Using two estimation strategies, one based on the 
substitution of the employer match with a non-contingent employer contribution, and the 
other based primarily on variation in the employer match across firms, we find that 
participation rates under automatic enrollment decline only modestly when the employer 
match is eliminated or reduced. The switch from a matching contribution to a non-
contingent contribution at Company A caused the plan participation rate at six months of 
tenure to drop by 5 to 6 percentage points. In a sample of nine firms with automatic 
enrollment, decreasing the employer match amount by 1% of pay was associated with a 
1.8 to 3.8 percentage point decrease in the plan participation rate at six months of 
eligibility. Collectively, these results imply that moving from a typical matching structure 
of 50% on the first 6% of pay contributed to no match at all would reduce savings plan 
participation under automatic enrollment by 5 to 11 percentage points. Interestingly, 
these results are similar to the employer match effect on participation estimated by 
Engelhardt and Kumar (forthcoming) in a sample of older employees, most of whom 
were not subject to automatic enrollment. 
Therefore, the success of automatic enrollment at increasing participation in 
employer-sponsored savings plans does not appear to rely much on having an employer 
match. It thus seems likely that automatic enrollment will also be effective at increasing 
participation in other contexts that do not naturally lend themselves to a matching 
contribution. 
These results also suggest that companies with automatic enrollment need not 
offer a match in order to achieve broad-based participation. However, the employer 
match may be valuable for reasons other than the inducement that it creates to participate. 
For example, as a tax-favored form of compensation, the employer match may be 
                                                 
17 To obtain safe harbor status, the plan must provide either a matching contribution equal to 100% of 
contributions up to 1% of pay and 50% of contributions for the next 5% of pay, or a non-contingent 
contribution of 3% of pay.   15
important in the recruiting and retention of employees even if it does not have a large 
impact on savings plan participation. 
However, the experience of Company A suggests that some of purposes served by 
an employer match could be achieved with a non-contingent employer contribution as 
well. The merits of an employer match versus a non-contingent contribution likely hinge 
not only on their average impact on savings plan outcomes (e.g., lower participation with 
a non-contingent contribution), but also on their distributional impact. For example, a 
non-contingent contribution will likely increase total savings for those employees least 
inclined to save, but its effects elsewhere in the savings distribution are ambiguous, since 
a match tends to cause herding at the match threshold. This herding may either increase 
or decrease savings, depending on how high the match threshold is and what savings rate 
employees would have chosen in the absence of a match.    16
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TABLE 1. 401(k) Plan Features at Company A 
Eligibility   
Eligible employees  Age 21+ 
Eligibility to make 
employee contributions 
Full-time employees: immediately upon hire 
Part-time employees: after 1 year of service and 1,000 hours 
Eligibility for employer 
contributions 
After 1 year of service and 1,000 hours 
Automatic Enrollment  Full-time employees automatically enrolled after 30 days at a 3% 
contribution rate allocated to a money market fund 
Contributions   
Employee contributions  Before 1/1/2004: up to 25% of pay 
After 1/1/2004: up to 15% of pay 
Employer contributions  Before 1/1/2004: employer match of 25% on first 4% of pay 
contributed by employee 
Starting 1/1/2004: non-contingent employer contribution of 4% of 
pay plus profit-sharing contribution 
Match Vesting  Immediate 
Other   
Loans Available 
Hardship withdrawals  Available; limited to one per year 
Investment choices  7 options including employer stock. 
Source: Summary Plan Descriptions   19
 
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics on Savings Plan Outcomes and Demographic 











Savings plan outcomes  
(at six months tenure)      
   Participation rate  89.1%  80.7%  2.95 
   Average contribution rate  
   (all employees)  3.60% 2.89%  3.01 
   Average contribution rate  
   (participants only)  4.04% 3.58%  1.86 
Demographic characteristics      
   Fraction female  51.5%  45.7%  1.47 
   Average age  33.21  31.83  2.07 
   Annual salary (2004 dollars)  $49,167  $40,343  2.93 
Sample size  N=293  N=352   
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample includes non-highly-compensated, full-time, 
savings-plan-eligible employees. Growth in seasonally adjusted average weekly earnings 
for private sector workers from the Current Employment Statistics survey is used to deflate 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 5. The Effect of the Employer Match on Savings Plan Participation under 
Automatic Enrollment 








(1) (2) (3) (4) 








Gender      









Age      
   Linear spline  No  Yes  No  Yes 
   Indicator for age missing  No  -0.4109 
(0.2125)
No No 
Income (2004 dollars)      
   Linear spline  No  Yes  No  Yes 
   Indicator for income missing  No  0.4882** 
(0.1128) 
No No 








Sample  size  N=44,279 N=44,279 N=35,895 N=35,895 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Huber-White robust standard errors with clustering by firm are 
reported in parentheses. The sample includes savings plan eligible employees ages 21-65. All 
regressions are linear probability regressions. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for 
savings plan participation. The maximum match is the maximum fraction of income an 
employee can receive in matching contributions by contributing at the match threshold and 
fulfilling all service requirements, given the match structure in place when the employee had 
six months of 401(k) eligibility. The coefficient on the maximum match represents the 
percentage point increase in the participation rate when employees are offered an additional 
one percent of their salary in matching contributions. The spline for age has knots at 30, 40, 
and 50 years, and the spline for income has knots at $20,000, $40,000, $60,000, and $80,000. 
Growth in seasonally adjusted average weekly earnings for private sector workers from the 
Current Employment Statistics survey is used to deflate employee salaries to 2004 dollars.  
** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
   23
  
FIGURE 1. Distribution of Contribution Rates with and without an Employer 












































Match cohort   Non-match cohort    24
 
FIGURE 2. Relationship between the Employer Match and Savings 
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Note: Each point represents the raw participation rate among individuals who are 
employed by a given firm with the specified match amount. Participation is defined as 
having a positive employee contribution rate at six months of eligibility. The match 
amount is defined as the maximum fraction of income an employee can receive in 
employer matching contributions by contributing at the match threshold and fulfilling 
all service requirements, given the match structure in place when the employee had 
six months of 401(k) eligibility. The slope and intercept of the fitted line are given by 
the coefficients on the match amount and the constant in column 1 of Table 5. 
 
 